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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model of a fishery which simultaneously incorporates random
stock growth and costly capital adjustment. Numerical techniques are used to solve for
the resource-rent-maximizing harvest and capital investment policies. Capital rigidities
bring diminishing marginal returns to the current period harvest, and introduce an in-
centive to smooth the catch over time. With density dependent stock growth, however,
catch smoothing increases stock variability resulting in reduced average yields. The
optimal management policy balances the catch smoothing benefits against yield loss.
We calibrate the model to the Alaskan pacific halibut fishery to demonstrate the main
insights.
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1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that stochastic stock growth and rigidities imposed by quasi-fixed
harvesting capital (e.g., fishing fleets) are important elements of the fisheries management
problem (Pindyck, 1984). Researchers to date however have been unable to incorporate these
two fundamental features together in the analysis of fisheries management. Computational
diﬃculties have forced authors to either ignore fishing capital constraints altogether or resort
to ad hoc assumptions for stock dynamics and harvest technologies to obtain tractable results
(Charles, 1983, 1985).1 As a result, little is known about the combined eﬀects of capital
constraints and stock growth uncertainty on optimal harvesting policies.
This paper builds a dynamic model of fishery management that incorporates uncertainty
regarding the growth of the biomass and capital adjustment costs. We solve a social plan-
ner’s problem, to maximize the expected value of the fishery resource by simultaneously
choosing the harvest quantity and investment (or disinvestment) in fish harvesting capital.
The resulting dynamic programming problem is solved by Value Function Iteration to obtain
the optimal harvest and capital investment feedback policies.
In our framework, the resource manager has an incentive to smooth the catch over time,
and most rapid approach path harvesting policies are ruled out. To see why, suppose that
favorable growing conditions lead to a large unanticipated increase in the size of the fish
stock. The fishery manager could choose to harvest the entire surplus immediately with the
currently available fishing fleet. However, this strategy may require large catches per boat,
and with diminishing marginal productivity of fishing capital, high harvest costs. The net
1Studies that incorporate quasi-fixed harvesting capital typically assume that stock growth is deterministic
(e.g., Smith, 1968, 1969; Clark, Clarke and Munro, 1979; Boyce, 1995). The implication of stochastic stock
growth often proceeds in the absence of harvesting capital constraints (e.g., Reed, 1979; Pindyck, 1984;
Berck and Perloﬀ, 1984; Clark and Kirkwood, 1986; Costello et al., 2001; Sethi et al., 2005).
2
return from harvesting the surplus fish immediately may be small, particularly if the current
fleet size is small. An alternative strategy is to bank some of the surplus growth for future
harvest. This can allow time to invest in additional fishing capital, which can then harvest
the surplus stock at lower cost, and higher net return.
Costly capital adjustment, and more generally, diminishing marginal returns to the cur-
rent period harvest, creates an incentive to smooth the catch over time. Catch smoothing
gains must be traded against the losses that result under widely fluctuating in situ stock
abundance (Reed, 1979; Pindyck, 1984). A fundamental property of renewable natural
resources is that stock growth is density dependent: growth is low when habitat is under-
utilized and declines when stock size is large as competition for food and habitat intensifies.
Formally, by Jensen’s inequality, average growth and correspondingly average sustainable
harvest will be highest when the fish stock is stabilized at intermediate levels.
Under stochastic growth the manager must strike a balance between stability of the in
situ fish stock and stability of the per period harvest. Our model balances this trade-oﬀ, and
shows how the optimal level of catch smoothing is aﬀected particularly by capital adjustments
costs, the curvature of the net harvest benefit function, the curvature of the stock growth
function, and persistence of environmental shocks.
In addition to the catch smoothing forces, our results highlight the importance of jointly
determining harvest and fishing capital investment policies. In our model, the immediate
harvest value of the fish stock is greater when there are more boats available to catch fish.
The optimal current period harvest is an increasing function of the vessel capital stock.
Moreover, high capital adjustment costs suggest reduced harvest variability; when it is more
costly to move boats in and out of the fishery, it will pay to reduce the variability of the
harvest even though this will reduce expected yields over time.
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These results have important policy implications. In practice, fisheries management is
decentralized: government agencies maintain responsibility for determining harvest policies
whereas private industry invests in fishing capital and carries out harvesting operations. The
harvest policy that is chosen by the government agent determines the current and future
distribution of catch and stock abundance, and thus determines the return to capital that is
vested in a fishery. Managers who ignore the capital investment incentives associated with
a particular harvesting rule may inadvertently, and possibly significantly, reduce the value
of a fishery resource. Likewise, harvest policies that are insensitive to the size of the vessel
capital stock will lower fishery value.
We calibrate our model to Management Unit 3A of the Alaskan pacific halibut (hip-
poglossus stenolepis) fishery. Calibration to an actual fishery demonstrates the importance
of the catch smoothing incentive, and the influence of private capital investment on harvest-
ing rules, under realistic conditions. Our results find that the actual management policy
for pacific halibut departs from the optimal policy along two dimensions. First, the halibut
fishery is managed by setting the yearly harvest as a fixed fraction of the exploitable bio-
mass. Based on our calibration we find that the constant harvest rate rule over-smooths the
catch relative to the optimal policy. Our results indicate that losses attributed to using the
constant harvest rate rule range between 1− 2% of the fishery value.
The second departure from the optimal policy concerns private investment in fishing
capital. Although the Alaskan halibut fishery has been managed with individual fishing
quotas since 1995, quota trading is severely restricted.2 These restrictions limit the quantity
of halibut that individual vessels are permitted to catch, which eﬀectively places a lower
2Concerns by regulators and industry that a freely tradable individual fishing quota system would lead
to dramatic fleet downsizing and economic and social disruptions, particularly in fishery-dependant western
Alaskan communities, led them to place tight restriction on harvest permit trading. See DiCosimo, 2004;
Pautzke and Oliver, 1997; Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas, 1999 for details.
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bound on the number of active vessels in the halibut fleet. We find that a much smaller fleet
consisting of vessels that target halibut throughout the entire fishing season would reduce
average harvesting costs by as much as 13− 19%. The analysis also shows how the harvest
policy can be adjusted to maximize fishery value in the presence of an oversized harvest fleet.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
numerical method used to solve for the optimal policy functions. The structure of the policy
functions, and implications for fisheries management are examined in Section 3. Section 4
characterizes the diﬀerences between the optimal policy and the actual management policy
used currently in the Alaskan pacific halibut fishery. Section 5 summarizes the main findings
and provides concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a planner who jointly chooses both the per-period harvest and the amount of
fish harvesting capital, i.e., size of the fishing fleet, with the goal of maximizing the value
of the fishery.3 Let t = 1, 2, ... index a particular fishing period. Each period is subdivided
into a harvest season, and a period that is closed to harvesting. We assume that all stock
growth occurs during the time the fishery is closed to harvesting. The exploitable biomass in
period t is denoted xt. We assume that xt is observed with certainty at the time that harvest
quantity ht is chosen.4 Period t + 1 escapement–the quantity of fish that escapes harvest
3Four U.S. fisheries are managed using individual fishing quotas, which establish property rights to harvest
share of the total catch. If quota trading occurs in competitive and frictionless markets, the vessel capital
stock would be determined optimally, and in the absence of commitment issues or other related concerns, a
manager with control of the aggregate harvest would be able to achieve the first best.
4While common in the literature (Reed, 1979), the assumption that xt is observed without error does not
describe real world fisheries management. An analysis of the eﬀects of stock mismeasurement is reserved for
future work. The assumption that harvest is selected after observing the realization of random stock growth
is somewhat representative of the actual timing of events in the halibut fishery, where fisheries scientists at
the International Pacific Halibut Commission derive a Bayesian updated estimate of xt prior to the selection
of ht.
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in the current period–is st+1 = xt − ht , where ht ∈ [0, xt] is period t harvest. Escapement
is nonnegative and cannot exceed the available biomass; st+1 ∈ [0, xt].
Fish stock growth is density dependent, and is influenced by random growth conditions
in the ocean environment. Following Reed (1979) and others, we assume that growth shocks
enter multiplicatively;
(1) xt+1 = zt+1G(st+1),
where G(·) is the deterministic component of growth satisfying ∂2G(.)/∂s2 < 0,and zt is a
mean 1 random variable with finite support [z, z], where 0 < z < z < ∞. The random
component, zt, is assumed to be a Markov process with a known transition distribution.
Growth shocks may be serially correlated, in which case, the conditional distribution of the
t+1 period shock will depend on zt. Identically and independently distributed shocks are a
special case.
The stock growth model implies an intermediate level of abundance at which the expected
per-period net growth is maximized. Density dependent growth introduces a trade-oﬀ be-
tween harvest smoothing and expected yield over time since a reduction in the variation
of escapement, st+1 = xt − ht, implies wider fluctuations in the harvest. The planner could
choose to set st = s for all t, in which case all growth stochasticity would have to be absorbed
by the harvest. Alternatively, the planner could choose a constant harvest ht = h, for all
t in which case all growth stochasticity emanates as in situ stock variability. An optimal
balance that is struck will depend on the nature of the per period benefits from fish harvest
and capital adjustment costs, which we address next.
The harvest benefit is B(ht), where B(·) is assumed to be a strictly concave function.
The harvest technology utilizes a single capital input denoted by k. For concreteness, kt
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will represent the number of vessels in the harvest fleet in period t. Individual vessel har-
vesting costs are assumed increasing and strictly convex in catch, and non-increasing in the
stock abundance. Fleet level harvesting costs in period t are denoted by C(ht, kt, xt). Our
assumptions for vessel-level costs imply that for fixed kt, C(ht, kt, xt) is strictly convex in ht
and non-increasing in xt.
Vessel capital (i.e., boats) can be moved in and out of the fishery but capital adjustment
takes time and is costly. We assume a one period delay is required before new capital
investment is operational, and before vested capital can be removed. The productive capital
stock in period t+1 is equal to the depreciated period t capital stock plus investment, which
we denote it:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it,
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the capital depreciation rate.
Fishing vessels are specific assets and are assumed to have discretely lower value in
alternative uses in the economy.5 Even if a vessel can be employed in other fisheries, capture
gear is often specific to a particular species of fish, and the skills of the captain and crew are
developed to operate a particular gear type, target a particular species of fish and operate
within specific geographical boundaries.6 Specificity of physical and human fishing capital is
appropriately modelled as non-convex capital adjustment costs. Denote the capital purchase
and resale prices as p+k and p
−
k , respectively, where p
+
k ≥ p−k .
Subject to the constraints described above, the social planner chooses the annual harvest
5Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979), Matulich, Mittelhammer and Roberte (1996), and Weninger and
McConnell (2000) have emphasized the specificity of fishing capital.
6Knowledge of the location of fish across space and time is essential for a successful fishing operation. This
knowledge may take years to acquire and likely involves costly investments in information, i.e., costly search
which generates information but not necessarily a saleable catch. While some skills may be transferable to
other fisheries, knowledge about the location of fish within the geographical boundary of the fishery is likely
to have discretely lower, possibly zero, value elsewhere.
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and capital investment to maximize the expected present discounted value of the fishery:
(2) max
{ht,it}∞t=0
E0
( ∞X
t=0
βt[B(ht)− C(ht, kt, xt)− pkit]
)
,
where E0 is the expectations operator conditional on currently available information, β is
the discount factor, and pk follows:
pk =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p+k , if kt+1 > (1− δ)kt
p−k , if kt+1 ≤ (1− δ)kt,
.
It is instructive to review the timing of decisions and the information available when
decisions are made. At the beginning of period t the manager observes the exploitable
biomass xt, the current number of boats kt and chooses current harvest and investment.
Since past escapement st is known, the current period shock zt is also known.7 As past
escapement and current shock jointly determine the exploitable biomass, both st and zt are
state variables in the model. Note that, except for the special case of independent shocks,
the current shock zt also conditions the distribution of future shocks. State variables are
thus (kt, st, zt) where kt and st are endogenous, chosen in period t− 1, and zt is exogenously
determined. Given xt and kt, choosing ht and it is equivalent to choosing st+1 and kt+1.
Adopting standard dynamic programming literature notation we write the state variables as
(kt, st, zt) ≡ (k, s, z) and the controls as (kt+1, st+1) ≡ (k0, s0). It will be convenient to write
the current period net harvest benefits as
Π(k, s, z, s0) = B(zG(s)− s0)− C(zG(s)− s0, k, zG(s)),
7In the pacific halibut fishery the growth of the stock is aﬀected by surface water temperatures that follow
decadal oscillations (Clark et al., 1999). Water temperatures are easily measured and thus the assumption
of observable shocks is not unreasonable.
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where we have made the substitution h = zG(s) − s0. The management problem can be
formulated as a recursive problem with Bellman equation given by:
(3) V (k, s, z) = max
k0,s0
{Π(k, s, z, s0)− pk (k0 − (1− δ) k) + β E [V (k0, s0, z0)|z]},
where E (.|z) denotes the conditional expectation given the current shock z, and V (k0, s0, z0)
is the optimized value of the fishery given the one-period-ahead state variables. The solution
we seek is pair of policy functions s0 = S(k, s, z) and k0 = K(k, s, z) which determine the
controls k0 and s0 for all possible (current) states (k, s, z). Solutions for V (.), S(.) and K(.)
must be approximated using numerical methods. Before we turn to the numerical analysis,
several useful insights are obtained by examining the necessary conditions for the solution.
We will consider a special case of the model where the vessel capital purchase and resale
prices are equal; p+k = p
−
k . Under this assumption investment can be reversed at no cost.
However, because one period delay is required to install and remove capital, investment
and divestment must still be forward looking. We will use subscripts to denote partial
diﬀerentiation.
The first order conditions and the envelope conditions can be combined to obtain the
following optimality condition for the choice of capital8
(4) pk (r + δ) = E {−Ck (h0, k0, x0) |z}
where r is the interest rate and we have used the relation β ≡ 1/(1 + r). The left hand side
of (4) is the real rental price of an additional unit of vessel capital while the right-hand site
8First order conditions for the capital and escapement choice are, −pk + βE {Vk (k0, s0, z0) |z} = 0, and
−Bh + Ch + βE {Vs (k0, s0, z0) |z} = 0, respectively. Envelope conditions for capital and escapement are
respectively, Vk(k, s, z) = −Ck + pk (1− δ) and Vs(k, s, z) = (Bh − Ch − Cx) z Gs (s).
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denotes the expected reduction in marginal harvesting cost (assuming Ck < 0) from adding
the marginal unit. Under general harvesting technologies, the expected cost reduction from
adding capital will vary with next-period harvest h0 = z0G(s0)− s00 and next periods stock,
x0 = z0G(s0). In general, we expect Ckh 6= 0, and Ckx 6= 0 which implies that the expected
cost saving from adjusting capital is aﬀected by the escapement choice s0. Hence, capital k0
and escapement s0 choices cannot be made independently.
Following similar steps as above yields the Euler equation for escapement, and thus
harvest,
(5) Πh = β E {(Π0h +Π0x) z0Gs (s0) |z},
where Π0 denotes the one-period ahead net harvest benefits (function arguments have been
dropped to ease notation). Equation (5) is a modified golden rule for our model: the left
hand side is the marginal net benefit from harvesting an additional unit of the fish stock
in the current period, while the right hand side is shadow price of the resource, i.e., the
discounted expected value of a marginal unit of stock in situ. Leaving a unit of the stock
in the ocean for another period adds z0Gs(s0) units to next period stock. The value of this
marginal growth is the marginal contribution to future net harvest benefits Π0h plus the
marginal reduction in harvesting costs, or stock eﬀect, Π0x = −C 0x (> 0). From (5) we see
that the current marginal value of harvesting a unit of the fish stock is set equal to the
discounted expected (total) gain from leaving that unit in the sea. Note also that Π0h and Π
0
x
both depend on one-period ahead fleet size, and consequently current escapement s0 must
be chosen jointly with k0.
When net harvest benefits are concave in h, variations in stock abundance caused by
random growth shocks are spread over time in order to satisfy (5). Suppose for a moment
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that there is no harvesting cost stock eﬀect, Cx = 0. The Euler equation in (5) becomes
Πh = β E{Π0h z0Gs (s0) |z}. In a deterministic environment the steady state harvest will
satisfy Πh = Π0h which suggests z
0Gs (s0) = β−1; in steady state the gross growth rate equals
the gross interest rate. In the stochastic environment of our model, both h and s0 have uni-
modal stationary distributions. Notice that Gs (s0) is known; then ignoring the covariance
between Π0h and z
0, assume for a moment that β E{z0Gs (s0) |z} is close to unity.9 We see
that optimal escapement is chosen to equate the current and the one-period-ahead expected
marginal net benefit; Πh = E {Π0h}. The net benefit function is strictly concave, Πhh < 0.
Satisfying equation (5), by Jensen’s inequality, requires smoothing the harvest over time.
Catch smoothing benefits must however be balanced against stock smoothing forces.
Suppose a sudden windfall in stock abundance, x is realized. One strategy is to set s0
such that current harvest h = x − s0 satisfies Πh = E{Π0h |z}. However, if x is large, this
strategy may require that s0 is too large. Concavity of the stock growth function implies
that Gs (s0) E{z0 |z} may be small relative to β−1 when s0 is large.
The curvature of the stock growth function and the curvature of the net benefit function,
more precisely the magnitudes of Gss and Πhh = Bhh−Chh, will determine how much catch
smoothening is carried out under the optimal management policy. Stock growth and the
benefits from consuming fish, B(.) are exogenous to the model. However, because marginal
harvesting cost is aﬀected by fleet size, the curvature of the harvest cost function is endoge-
nous to the model. Put simply, adding another boat to the fleet means that each vessel
harvests a smaller share of h. Under our assumption that vessel level costs are increasing
9Note that
β E{Π0h z0Gs (s0) |z} = E {Π0h} β Gs (s0)E {z0|z}+Gs (s0)Cov {Π0h, z0} .
In general, a higher value of z is expected to call for a higher value of h and thus the covariance term is likely
to be negative. However, under the presence of diminishing marginal return, as the harvest variability is
muted, the magnitude of the covariance is relatively small and can be safely ignored for the sake of exposition.
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and strictly convex in catch, Chk < 0 in the eﬀective region, and the manager can aﬀect the
rate at which future harvesting costs increase.
Consider once again the case of a sudden windfall of stock abundance. Since curvature of
the current net benefits can not instantaneously be adjusted, it may pay to rent another boat
(with reversible investment, renting and buying are equivalent) and wait to harvest some
of the excess stock next period. Delaying harvest, or banking some of the excess growth,
provides time to increase k0 and reduce the concavity of the one-period-ahead net benefit
function. At the margin, this capital adjustment must follow (4).
Lastly, notice that the conditional expectations for the future shock aﬀects the necessary
conditions for both capital investment and escapement. Costello et al. (2001) study the
eﬀects of expected growth productivity shocks on escapement. These authors find that
when future stock growth conditions are expected to be good, more fish should be left in the
sea since the expected return to investing in the in situ fish stock is relatively high. This
result leads to a somewhat counter-intuitive harvest policy where, ceteris paribus, current
catch is reduced (increased) if future environmental conditions and future stock abundance is
expected to be high (low). Equation (5) shows as well that the incentive to invest in the fish
stock is enhanced when expected environmental conditions are above average. Importantly,
however, because our model assumes that net harvest benefits are a concave function of
the catch, an important counterforce to the incentives outlined in Costello et al. (2001) is
present. Suppose the manager expects that poor stock growth conditions will prevail in the
future. Reducing current escapement in anticipation of poor stock growth means increasing
current period harvest. But since Πhh < 0, a high h would mean low marginal net harvest
benefits currently. With low escapement and poor anticipated growth, the manager would
also expect to be starved for fish in the next harvest period, which would cause E{Π0h |z} to
12
be high. It is easy to see that the incentive to smooth the harvest over time counteracts the
incentive to adjust the investment in the in situ stock in response to changes in anticipated
stock growth conditions. Indeed, if the catch smoothing incentive is suﬃciently strong, the
optimal harvest can vary positively with anticipated stock growth conditions.
With costly investment reversibility, p+k > p
−
k , the forces underlying the capital and es-
capement Euler equations remain operational, although capital adjustments will be muted.
New investment will be undertaken when the current realization of growth shock is partic-
ularly high. Conversely, existing vessel capital will be put on sale when the current shock
realization is particularly low. For the intermediate range of shocks it will be optimal, how-
ever, to neither invest in new capital nor sell the existing stock. These investment responses
will also depend on the current size of the stock biomass and persistence of shocks.
Numerical solutions for V (.), K(.) and S(.) are needed to generate further insights, and
the next section numerically solves the model calibrated to a particular fishery. It should
be emphasized that the forces that underlie the catch smoothing incentive outlined in this
section will be present except in very special circumstances. From equation (5) we see that the
harvest smoothing incentive disappears if Πhh = 0. The required condition is that net harvest
benefits be linear in h. For this condition to hold in practice requires first, that the marginal
benefit of consuming fish is constant (non-diminishing). If consumer surplus is adopted as a
benefit measure, Bhh = 0 only if the demand for fish is perfectly elastic. Perfectly elastic fish
demand may be a reasonable assumption for some fisheries if for example consumers view
diﬀerent species of fish as substitutes and the harvest from the fishery under consideration
is small relative to total fish production. A second requirement is that Chh = 0, in other
words, the marginal cost of harvesting fish is constant. Constant marginal harvesting cost
requires that the returns to a fixed vessel capital stock do not diminish, or fishing capital
13
can be costlessly and instantaneously adjusted. These conditions are not representative of
real world fisheries.
In sum, the assumption of diminishing marginal returns to the current period harvest
quantity would appear to be quite robust. Thus while optimal management policies will
diﬀer quantitatively across fisheries, qualitatively, the principles discussed in this section
and the qualitative results to follow generalize to other fisheries.
2.1 Value Function Iteration
We solve for V (.), S(.) and K(.) numerically by iterating on the Bellman equation (3). Judd
(1998) provides a complete discussion of Value Function Iteration.
The numerical technique entails discretizing the state space and then iterating on the
Bellman equation, starting with an initial guess V0 for the value function. It can be shown (see
Stokey and Lucas (1989)) that the iterative process converges to the unique value function
V . Subsequently, we use information on the distribution of z along with the optimal policy
functions to compute the invariant joint distribution of (k, s), which is then used to obtain
various statistics of interest.
The Bellman equation for the optimization problem can be rewritten as
V (k, s, z) = max
k0,s0
{F (k, s, z, k0, s0) + β E [V (k0, s0, z0)|z]} ,
where F (k, s, z, k0, s0) ≡ Π(k, s, z, s0) − pk (k0 − (1− δ) k) denotes the net harvest benefits
less any capital adjustment costs or payoﬀ, given current states (k, s, z) and next period’s
endogenous states k0 and s0. We discretize the state space in the following way. First,
the stochastic process for z is approximated by nz states,{z1, z2..., znz}, characterized by
a transition probability matrix P with dimension nz × nz. Further, let nk and ns be the
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discrete number of states for the number of boats and escapement, given by {k1, k2, ...., knk}
and {s1, s2, ....., sns}, respectively. Then, we can represent V defined over a three dimensional
discrete space with dimensions nk×ns×nz. Define an operator TV that maps the function V
to another function over the same space. The unique fixed point of this mapping is obtained
as V = TV . The elements of TV are obtained as follows:
(6) TV (kl, sm, zi) = max
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Flmi|{z}
nk×ns
+ β
nzX
j=1
P (i, j) V (., ., zj)| {z }
nk×ns| {z }
nk×ns
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
where Flmi is an nk × ns matrix whose element in the vth row and wth column is defined as
Flmi (v, w) ≡ F (kl, sm, zi, kv, sw). Note that P (i, j) ≡ Pr (z0 = zj|z = zi) is the {i, j} element
of the transition matrix. Within brackets, the two nk×ns matrices are first added element-by-
element, and then the max operator returns the maximum element of the resultant matrix.
We begin with an initial guess for V as V0. Then, Vn+1 = TVn. In this manner we iterate
until convergence is achieved as per our criterion of max {|V − TV |} < 0.0001. Notice that
(6) also obtains policy functions for the choice of number of boats and escapement for the
next period. Specifically:
k0 = K (kl, sm, zi) = krow, and
s0 = S (kl, sm, zi) = scol.
where row and col refer to the row and column of the maximum element on the right hand
side of (6).
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2.2 Calibration to the Alaskan halibut fishery
We calibrate the model to the Alaskan pacific halibut fishery. Halibut are a long-lived bot-
tom dwelling flatfish species which exhibit relatively slow intrinsic rates of growth. Stock
abundance and growth is relatively well-understood (see Sullivan, Parma, and Clark, 1999).
Growth and survival rates vary with changing ocean water temperatures, currents, availabil-
ity of food among other factors. Growth rates are positively correlated with ocean current
patterns that are persistent, following mutliple-year cycles.
Halibut are harvested with longline gear, i.e., baited hooks spaced along a main cable
that is lowered to the sea floor. After the gear has soaked, the longline is recovered with
a hydraulic winch. Captured fish are placed on ice and transported to ports in Alaska and
Seattle. Most halibut is sold in fresh form to U.S. restaurants and grocery stores.10 Alaskan
halibut revenues exceeded $172 million in 2003.
The model consists of four components: (1) the harvest benefit function; (2) the fleet
harvesting cost function; (3) capital purchase and sale prices; and (4), the stock growth
function. Due to space limitations, we present a brief overview of the calibration of each
component. A complete discussion of the data and estimation used to calibrate the model
is presented in an Extended Appendix, which is available from the authors.
Harvest benefit function: Following Criddle and Herrmann (2003) we assume a linear
inverse demand for halibut, P (h) = α0 − α1h. Using consumer surplus as a measure of
consumer welfare, the per-period total benefit from the halibut harvest h is the sum of
consumer surplus plus industry revenues;
(7) B(h) = α1h−
1
2
α2h2,
10Crutchfield and Zellner (1962) provide an extensive survey of the historical development of the pacific
halibut fishery.
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where benefits are denoted in 1997 dollars (all subsequent values are also in 1997 $s). All
parameter values are reported below in Table 1.
Harvesting costs: Operating cost data from a sample of 69 class 2 vessels that harvested
halibut during the 1997 fishing season are used to estimate fleet harvesting costs. Variable
costs include fuel, bait and ice, and food and supplies for the captain and crew, and lost
gear. A cubic functional form is used to allow a flexible relationship between vessel harvest
costs c(q, x) and catch q;
(8) c(q, x) = FC +
¡
β0 + β1q + β2q
2 + β3q
3
¢
x−βx,
where FC denotes annual fixed costs, e.g., expenses for vessel mooring and storage, permits
and licence fees, and fees for accountants, lawyers, oﬃce support, and routine maintenance
and repairs.11
Capital adjustment costs: We assume that a well-functioning market exists for used
fishing boats and set the capital salvage price, p−k equal to the mean self-reported resale
value from the 1997 cost data. The wedge between the purchase and resale price is assumed
to result from refitting costs that are incurred when switching between fisheries. Halibut
fishermen inform us that the cost of refitting a boat which already uses fixed gear requires
a relatively modest refit at a cost of approximately $27,000. If the boat is switched from
a trawl gear fishery, the refit costs may increase to $85,000. It should be noted that these
refit cost estimates do not include human capital adjustment costs for example, the costs to
retrain the captain and crew to fish for a diﬀerent species, using diﬀerent gear. Our baseline
calibration assumes the wedge between the vessel purchase and resale prices is equal to the
11We include the labor services of the captain and crew as a fixed cost component. While labor is often
treated as a variable input, crew services are not easily adjusted in the short run, and crew adjustments tend
to be infrequent.
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Component Functional form Base Case Parameters
Harvest Benefits B(h) = α1h− 12α2h2 α1 = 2.9854; α2 = 3.6× 10−4
Fleet Costs C(h, k, x) = k · c(q, x), q = h/k FC = 134.451; β0 = 0.453;
Vessel Costs c(q, x) = FC +
³P3
j=0 βjq
j
´
x−βx β1 = 0.130;β2 = −0.387× 10−3;
β3 = 0.750× 10−6; βx = 1.0281
Capital Price pk =
½
p+k , if k
0 > (1− δ)k
p−k , if k
0 ≤ (1− δ)k
p+k = $236, 500; p
−
k = $160, 000
δ = 0.1
Stock Growth G(s) = s+ γs(1− s/xc) γ = 0.283; xc = 443, 392.07
Table 1: Model Calibration Summary.
refit cost of $76, 500. Capital depreciation, δ, is the mean value reported in the 1997 data.
Stock growth model: We obtained pre-harvest exploitable biomass, x, harvest, h and
escapement, s, data for management unit 3A during 1974-2003. A Logistic growth function,
G(s) = s+γs(1−s/xc), is fit to the data using an iterative feasible generalized least squares
procedure. The state space for the random shock z and the Markov transition matrix are
calculated following Judd (1998, p. 85-88).
Table 1 summarizes the calibration and reports baseline parameter values. We emphasize
that data limitations required that the model be calibrated to Management Unit 3A only.
This management unit produces roughly 55% of all commercial harvests (U.S. and Canada).
Diﬀerences in stock growth throughout the halibut range, and diﬀerences on harvesting costs,
do not allow us to extrapolate the results to the entire halibut fishery (which extends through
the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska along the North American pacific coast to California). We
have also assumed that the fishing fleet is comprised entirely of class 2 vessels, i.e., vessels
ranging in length from 35-60 feet. This is the most common vessel size, and class 2 vessels
harvest the largest share of the Alaskan catch (on average 54.92% during 1995-2002). Lastly,
growth shocks are positively serially correlated due to cyclical weather patterns that impact
water temperature and stock growth.
The empirical calibration is subject to the usual econometric limitations, e.g., specifica-
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Figure 1: Optimal Escapement Policy
tion and data errors. The results that follow must be interpreted with these limitations in
mind.
3 Results
3.1 The optimal policy
Figure 1 plots a cross section of the optimal escapement policy function s0 = S(k, s, z). The
range of the k and s values correspond to their respective 99% confidence intervals obtained
from the invariant distributions, and the value of the shock, z, is equal to its mean of 1.
Observe that optimal escapement is increasing in s and decreasing in k. When past
escapement s is large, and a z = 1 shock is realized, the beginning period stock size x
is also relatively large. With costly capital adjustment, particularly in the short run, and
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Figure 2: Optimal Capital Investment Policy
diminishing marginal net benefits, it is best to increase the current escapement and bank
some fish for future harvest.
With a large fishing fleet, the costs per unit of harvested fish rise at a slower rate.
Alternatively, the rate at which current period marginal net benefits decline is less when
k is large. As shown in Figure 1, optimal escapement (current period harvest) is inversely
(directly) related to the size of the fishing fleet.
Note that with serially correlated shocks, a diﬀerent cross section of the escapement
policy exist for each realization of z. These results are qualitatively similar to those reported
in Figure 1 and to save space are not reported.
The capital investment policy function is more complicated. Figure 2 reports two cross
sections; panel (a) reports the optimal k0 conditional on current capital k (displayed along
20
the horizontal axis) while holding s constant at its median value (204 million pounds). Panel
(b) depicts optimal k0 conditional the previous escapement, s, this time holding k constant
at its median value of 58 boats. Both panels report results for the mean value shock, z = 1.
The marginal value of fishing capital depends on current and future harvest and stock
abundance, and includes the value of the option to optimally respond to changes is stock
conditions over time. Figure 2 shows that prescribed changes in the fleet size are quite
intuitive.
Consider panel (a) in Figure 2 first. Recall that as the current fleet size increases, moving
left to right in the figure, escapement declines (see Figure 1). Consequently, future expected
harvest declines with larger k which implies that the expected marginal value of capital
declines with k. The number of boats that are added to the fleet declines in k for k between
40 and 50 boats.
To assist in interpreting the results, a dashed line identifying zero investment, k0 =
(1−δ)k, is shown in panel (a). At small fleet sizes and average stock abundance, the expected
marginal value of fishing capital exceeds the capital purchase price, p+k and investment in
additional boats is optimal. For fleet sizes between roughly 60 and 65 boats, boats are being
added to the fleet however at a rate that is less than physical depreciation. For fleet sizes
between roughly 65 and 76 boats, investment is zero. In this region the expected marginal
value of capital lies in the interval [p−k , p
+
k ], and the optimal action for the manager is to
neither invest nor divest capital from the fleet. At k ≥ 76, divestment is optimal since the
expected marginal value the current capital stock is below the salvage price p−k .
Turn now to panel (b) in Figure 2. To assist in interpreting the results, a dashed line
has been drawn at current fleet size, k = 58 boats, and at (1 − δ)k equal to 53 boats. At
escapement levels below 159 million pounds, future expected catch is low and the expected
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marginal value of capital, adjusted for depreciation, is below the salvage price p−k . In this
region of escapement it is optimal to divest boats from the fishing fleet. For escapement
levels between roughly 159 and 181.5 million pounds, the expected marginal value of capital
(at k = 58) lies between the capital salvage and purchase prices. As in panel (a), investment
inactivity is prescribed. At s = 181.5 million pounds, boats are added but at a rate less
than depreciation; the expected marginal value of eﬀective capital is maintained at p+k . At
s = 204 million pounds and above, the expected marginal value of capital exceeds p+k and
net investment is positive.
Turn now to the role of the environmental shocks. Our investigations of the policy func-
tions find that the optimal escapement and capital investment choices vary with z in expected
ways. We can obtain further insights by isolating the eﬀects of good versus poor expected
environmental conditions. For this purpose the following experiment was conducted. In a
separate simulation we solved for the optimal escapement policy under the assumption that
net benefits are linear in the harvest. Essentially we remove capital from the model by
assuming that marginal harvesting costs are constant and that consumer demand for halibut
is perfectly elastic.
We then hold recruitment x fixed and examine how the optimal escapement choice varies
with z. The scenario under consideration is thus one where the manager finds herself with the
same beginning period stock abundance but has diﬀerent expectations about the distribution
of the future growth shock.12
Results for the case where Πhh = 0 find that optimal escapement varies positively with
z. Recall that growth shocks are positive serially correlated. When the current z is low,
12In our model, there are nz possible ways to arrive at the same (approximate) level of recruitment. For
example, a given x is obtained with a high past escapement and low shock, or a low past escapement and
a high shock. Notice that this experiment replicates the conditions considered in Costello et al. (2001) and
thus we confirm their result.
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the manager also expects poor environmental conditions to prevail one period ahead, and
correspondingly leaves fewer fish in the sea because the expected return on investments in
the fish stock is relatively low (Costello, et al., 2001). When the current z is high, good
expected growth is expected and escapement is higher.
We compare this results to the optimal escapement policy under our baseline calibration
with Πhh < 0. We find that the optimal escapement is pretty much flat irrespective of the
value of z. Thus, Costello et al. prediction that a higher z should imply a higher s0 does not
hold due to the catch smoothing incentive in our model.
The results from this experiment also find that, in anticipation of high stock abundance in
the future, the size of the fishing fleet is increased, with more vessels being added the higher
is the current period environmental shock. By adding more boats, the manager reduces the
rate at which future marginal harvesting costs increase (the rate that future marginal net
benefits decline). This investment is made in anticipation of the larger expected harvest in
future periods.
Further insights are obtained by examining the eﬀects of model parameters on the in-
variant distributions of control and state variables. Table 2 reports mean values, standard
deviations, and 99% confidence intervals for capital, escapement, harvest, catch per boat
(h/k), the harvest rate (h/x), industry profits, and consumer surplus. The results for the
baseline calibration are presented in column 1. Columns 2-5 of Table 2 report results under
alternate model parameterizations which are chosen to demonstrate the intuition.
Column 2 of Table 2 reports results under the higher capital purchase price, and increased
adjustment costs.13 When boats are more expensive average fleet size is reduced and when
13Halibut skippers indicate that price of a new fully equipped fishing vessel is roughly $800,000 and that
a vessel that is scrapped for metal and parts would fetch roughly $25,000. In column 2, p+k = $800, 000 and
p−k = $25, 000. (The base case capital prices are p
+
k = $236, 500 and p
−
k = $160, 000).
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1 2 3 4 5
Baseline
calibration
High capital
cost
High discount
factor
Max. indus.
profits
iid
shocks
Capital
(boats)
57.78a
(4.44)b
[39,76]c
53.02
(6.51)
[36,67]
57.05
(7.43)
[38,74]
54.84
(2.25)
[45,56]
58.63
(4.91)
[46,69]
Escapement
(mill. lbs.)
204.61
(20.78)
[157.5,262.5]
209.11
(21.92)
[159.0,270.0]
165.27
(18.41)
[124.0,217.0]
247.24
(39.81)
[160.0,356.5]
204.69
(14.85)
[170.5,244.0]
Harvest
(mill. lbs.)
31.11
(4.96)
[19.16,43.57]
31.17
(4.87)
[19.20,43.30]
29.29
(4.81)
[17.87,41.86]
30.20
(2.38)
[22.23,34.54]
31.01
(3.35)
[22.26,39.78]
Harvest rate
(%)
13.13
(0.77)
[10.59,14.48]
12.91
(0.71)
[10.51,14.15]
14.99
(0.82)
[12.26,16.46]
11.01
(0.84)
[8.73,12.56]
13.14
(0.51)
[11.52,14.19]
Catch/Boat
(thous. lbs.)
527.31
(27.16)
[451.63,592.15]
585.72
(28.84)
[505.16,656.30]
511.45
(24.79)
[442.35,573.88]
549.90
(25.09)
[475.96,608.14]
528.62
(23.83)
[460.64,588.04]
Indus. Profit
($ mill. 1997)
41.60
(2.31)
[32.78,44.87]
38.54
(3.20)
[28.29,44.61]
39.87
(2.64)
[30.50,43.77]
42.91
(1.80)
[36.28,45.96]
42.04
(1.49)
[36.78,44.50]
Cons. Surplus
($ mill. 1997)
17.86
(5.62)
[6.60,34.17]
17.91
(5.52)
[6.63,33.75]
15.86
(5.16)
[5.75,31.54]
16.52
(2.51)
[8.90,21.48]
17.38
(3.77)
[8.92,28.48]
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis. a- denotes mean value, b-denotes standard
deviation, c-denotes 99 % confidence intervals.
capital adjustment is more costly less adjustment in the fleet size occurs, as indicated by the
confidence interval for the fleet size.14
Notice also the increase in the value and the volatility of escapement in column 2. When
it is more costly to adjust the size of the fleet, it is also more costly to adjust the size of the
in situ stock, e.g., large adjustments to the harvest may require costly changes in fleet size.
The increase in vessel capital costs reduces the overall economic flexibility, and the manager
reduces the volatility of the catch to some degree, which implies volatility of escapement
rises. Consumer surplus changes very little under the higher capital costs. As expected,
industry profits are considerably less and more variable than in the baseline calibration.
Columns 3 of Table 2 report results under lower discount factor, a higher interest rate.
14The reader will note that relative to the baseline calibration, the standard deviation for the number
of boats is higher with increased capital adjustment costs. Closer examination revealed that the standard
deviation is misleading due to large diﬀerences in the distribution kurtosis. The tighter confidence interval
for the fleet size under the higher capital adjustment costs more accurately describes capital adjustments.
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A higher interest rate changes the model variables in expected ways: escapement is reduced
(harvest is increased) so that the expected return on investment in the in situ stock is equal
to the now higher interest rate. The real price of capital has increased and slightly fewer
boats are employed in the fishery on average. Consumer surplus and industry profits are
smaller due primarily to the higher discounting of future returns.
Column 4 of Table 2 reports results for the case where the fishery is managed in order
to maximize the present discounted value of industry profits, rather than total net benefits
(industry profit plus consumer surplus). The harvest benefit function in this case is more
concave than in the baseline calibration because marginal industry revenues decline more
sharply than marginal total benefits. A key eﬀect is an increase in the standard deviation
of escapement and a reduction in the mean and standard deviation of the harvest. The
increased concavity in the current period payoﬀ function induces greater catch smoothing
at a cost of increased escapement volatility and lower average yield. Interestingly, when
consumer surplus is not valued by the fishery manager, more fish are left in the sea i.e., a
more conservative harvest policy is adopted.
Column 5 of Table 2 reports results under iid shocks. The main eﬀect, relative to the
base case, is to reduced the variance of most state and control variables, as well as the
corresponding welfare measures. Under independent shocks the probability of observing a
sequence of low or high shocks is reduced; s and k spend less time in the tails of their
respective distributions. This suggests that there will be fewer adjustments required to
maintain the state variables at preferred levels. In particular, the 99% confidence interval
for boats is much tighter under iid shocks. A comparison of the welfare measures under
iid shocks and the baseline model indicates that the reduced capital adjustment increases
industry profits..
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Summarizing the results reported in Table 2 we find that factors that increase the con-
cavity of the net benefit function lead to more smoothing of the catch. Increased capital
adjustments costs lead to slight reductions in catch variability and slight increases in vari-
ability of escapement. The variability of the control and state variables is reduced under iid
shocks.
Finally, we consider the value of the fishery, V (k, s, z), if managed under the optimal
policies. Like the policy functions described above, the fishery value depends on the state
variables k, s, and z. Our results show that the value function is increasing in the initial
escapement. This is not surprising, since large s means higher expected future stock levels.
This is at least weakly preferable to a low initial stock level since, a manager faced with an
abundance of fish in the sea, always has the option to not harvest more fish than desired in
which case the fish stock will grow to its natural carrying capacity. The value of the fishery is
also increasing in the starting level of the capital stock. This might seem surprising given the
problems associated with the overcapitalization of many ocean fisheries (FAO, 1999; Munro,
1998; FFITF, 1999; see also NMFS, 2003), but observe that in our model the initial capital
stock represents an endowment, and the planner always has the option of selling oﬀ any
unwanted boats. As long as the capital salvage price is strictly positive, additional boats
increase the value of the fishery.15 Given k and s, a higher (lower) value of z implies a higher
(lower) current stock abundance. Moreover, with positively serially correlated shocks, a high
current growth shock increases the probability of high future shocks, and visa versa. Fishery
value is thus increasing in z. To provide context for our results the value of the optimally
managed fishery at the mean values for (k, s, z) is roughly $1.645 billion.
15Since the model deals with the aggregate value of the fishery, complications involving the distribution
of benefits, which may be substantial in real world fisheries, do not arise here.
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4 Implications for real world fisheries management
Contrary to our model of a single planner, real world fisheries management programs tend
to be decentralized. Government agencies maintain control over harvest policies, whereas
private industry carries out investments in fishing capital and harvesting operations. As
shown in the preceding section, the harvest policy determines the distribution of total fleet
and individual vessel catch over time and thus determines the value of vested fishing capital.
This section demonstrates these principles in practice. We briefly discuss the pacific halibut
management program. We then demonstrate how departures between the optimal and the
actual management policy that is currently in place in the pacific halibut fishery aﬀect fishery
value.
4.1 Overview of U.S. pacific halibut management
The International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) is responsible for managing the pacific
halibut stock.16 Following each harvest season (March 15 through November 15), commercial
catch and eﬀort data, and in some years independent survey data, is analyzed by fisheries
scientists at the IPHC. The data are used to generate a Bayesian updated estimate of halibut
stock abundance across its range. IPHC scientists make a catch recommendation for the up-
coming harvest season. An annual meeting is scheduled prior to the season opening at which
time members of the public, and of course fishermen are invited to comment on the IPHC
catch recommendation. IPHC board members then select the next-period harvest. Cur-
rently, the halibut stock is managed under a constant harvest rate policy wherein allowable
16A 1923 convention between Canadian and U.S. Governments led to the establishment of the International
Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC). The IPHC consists of three government appointed commissioners for
each country. The mandate of the IPHC is research and management of halibut throughout its northwestern
North American range. Crutchfield and Zellner (1962) provide a comprehensive account of the historical
development of the pacific halibut fishery.
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annual removals are determined as a constant fraction, 20%, of the estimated exploitable
biomass.17
Prior to 1995, command and control regulations were used to ensure commercial harvests
did not exceed target levels. Restrictions on the length of the fishing season were used to
limit the total fleet catch. Because entry of new vessel was unrestricted, the fleet size grew
unabated, leading to increasingly shorter halibut fishery openings. The race for fish that
ensued is an often cited example of the failures of command and control management. In
1994 for example, the bulk of the U.S. annual halibut catch was harvested in 2 six hour
openings.
Short season lengths, a dangerous race for fish, and economic waste spurred the adoption
of property rights-based management approach in 1991 for the Canadian fleet and in 1995 for
the U.S. fleet. Individual fishing quotas or IFQs grant their owner exclusive rights to harvest
shares of the annual halibut catch. Halibut quota shares were initially allocated gratis to
5,484 vessels owners and leaseholders that had verifiable commercial halibut landings during
1988-1990.18
Designers of the U.S. rights-based program were concerned that unrestricted transferabil-
ity of IFQs would lead to significant geographical redistribution of harvesting activity. In
particular, it was feared that consolidation of IFQ ownership would change the fishery from
a small-boat fishery concentrated in western Alaskan coastal communities to a large boat
fleet operating out of non-Alaskan ports, in particular Seattle, Washington. Restrictions on
transferability and ownership were included in the initial program design. Caps were placed
17A constant harvest rate policy is suggested for pacific halibut fishery by Sullivan, Parma and Clark
(1999), “because this kind of strategy has been shown to achieve close to optimal yields in the face of
long-term changes in productivity such as exhibited by pacific halibut”.
18See Committee to Review Individual fishing Quotas (1999) for additional discussion of the operation of
the US rights-based management program. Grafton, Squires and Fox (2000) discuss the Canadian rights-
based management program.
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in the amount of IFQ that single individual can own (0.5% of the total quota in any region
and for all regions combined), a requirement that the IFQ owner be on board the vessel when
fishing takes place was imposed, and restrictions were placed on quota transferability from
smaller to larger vessels. Finally, a complex system of blocking was adopted which eﬀectively
limits the quantity that can be harvested from a single vessel (see Pautzke and Oliver, 1997).
Space limitations do not permit a complete description of the halibut management pro-
gram or the factors that lead to its design. The reader is referred to an extended appendix
to this paper, Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas (1999), Pautzke and Oliver,
(1997).
4.2 Departures from the optimal policy
We characterize the current management regime as exhibiting two main departures from
the optimal policy identified in section 3. First, the fish stock is managed using a constant
harvest rate (hereafter, CHR) rule, by which the catch is determined as a fixed percentage
of the beginning period stock. In the notation of the model in Section 2, h = θzG(s),
where θ ∈ [0, 1]. Under the CHR rule escapement does not vary with fleet size. Harvest is
increasing in x, but depends on the product of the growth shock and G(s), whereas under
the optimal harvest policy, z and s have separate eﬀects on escapement and thus harvest.
A second obvious diﬀerence between the actual and optimal policy results from the re-
strictions placed on the consolidation of harvest quota; the number of boats in the pacific
halibut fishery is bounded below. To analyze the eﬀects of this policy we require an esti-
mate of the regulated minimum fleet size. DiCosimo (2004) reports that the restrictions on
harvest permit trading impose a minimum fleet size in the entire halibut fishery, all regions
and all vessel classes, of 1,050 boats. This estimate cannot be translated directly to our
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calibration which focusses on management unit 3A and class 2 vessels only. We can capture
the intent of the regulation. The average annual harvest of halibut in Alaskan pacific during
1995-2002 was 50.945 million pounds. On average, class 2 boats harvested 55% of this total
and numbered 50% of the halibut fleet. The restrictions on quota trading were designed
such that class 2 boats harvested no more than 53,295 pounds of halibut annually: the min-
imum number of class 2 vessels is 0.5× 1, 050 = 525 boats and the class 2 quota share is
0.5492 × 50.945 = 27.98 million pounds. This implies a 53,295 pound per vessel maximum
catch. Scaling this intended catch per boat to match the average harvest quantities from
Table 2 suggests a regulated minimum fleet size of 583 vessels.
Most halibut vessels spend only a small fraction of the year fishing for halibut and
participate in other fisheries during each year. The baseline model discussed in the previous
section assumes vessel specialize in halibut for the full 8 month season. Our data indicates
that sample vessels spent only 9.4% of their total trips per year fishing for halibut. There
are two adjustments we need to make to the model to account for this. First, since each
boat spends only a fraction of total trips fishing for halibut, our estimate of the fixed costs
associated with operating a boat is too high. We thus scale down the fixed cost of operating
a boat so that is in proportion to the fraction of trips spent fishing for halibut. Second, we
add refitting costs to the (adjusted) annual fixed costs of operating the boat since each boat
must gear up for the halibut season each year.
Column 1 of Table 3 repeats the optimal policy results for the baseline calibration. Col-
umn 2 reports the results under a CHR rule and the optimal capital investment policy. That
is, conditional on the employing a CHR harvest rule, we solve for the optimal capital invest-
ment policy functions. This scenario represents the case where the IPHC continues to select
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1 2 3 4
Opt. Harvest
Opt. Capital
Best CHR
Opt. Capital
Opt. Harvest
Fixed Capital
Best CHR
Fixed Capital
Capital
(boats)
57.78a
(4.44)b
[39,76]c
58.58
(5.57)
[45,72]
583
(0)
na
583
(0)
na
Escapement
(mill. lbs.)
204.61
(20.78)
[157.5,262.5]
201.73
(27.24)
[138.0,274.5]
199.90
(17.12)
[161.5,247.0]
237.74
(29.17)
[168.0,315.0]
Harvest
(mill. lbs.)
31.11
(4.96)
[19.16,43.57]
30.85
(4.18)
[21.15,41.84]
31.05
(5.22)
[18.66,44.55]
30.90
(3.82)
[21.09,41.74]
Harvest rate
(%)
13.13
(0.77)
[10.59,14.48]
13.26
(0)
na
13.35
(1.10)
[10.21,15.28]
11.50
(0)
na
Catch/Boat
(thous. lbs.)
527.31
(27.16)
[451.63,592.15]
524.88
(29.20)
[450.62,599.77]
53.26
(8.95)
[32.00,76.41]
53.98
(6.54)
[37.66,70.36]
Indus. Profit
($ mill. 1997)
41.60
(2.31)
[32.78,44.87]
41.68
(2.04)
[34.59,44.83]
14.56
(3.83)
[14.84,19.21]
15.67
(3.04)
[11.97,34.34]
Cons. Surplus
($ mill. 1997)
17.86
(5.62)
[6.60,34.17]
17.44
(4.72)
[8.05,31.51]
17.84
(5.92)
[6.26,35.72]
17.61
(4.66)
[6.16,20.52]
Table 3: Constant Harvest Policy. a-denotes mean, b-denotes standard deviation,
c-denotes 99 % confidence intervals.
the annual catch following the CHR, and all quota trading restrictions are removed.19 The
results for the harvest rate that maximizes the value of the fishery (13.26%) are reported
(The fishery-value-maximizing harvest rate did not depend strongly on the choice of initial
conditions.)
Comparing the results in column 1 and 2 of Table 3 finds that the mean and the standard
deviation of boats is higher under the CHR policy, and that escapement is smaller but more
variable under the CHR rule. The lost flexibility for adjusting the harvest rate explains
this finding. Under the optimal policy h/x is adjusted in response to random stock growth
and changes in fleet size. Under the CHR rule catch is increased (reduced) when stock
abundance is large (small), but adjustments to the harvest are less aggressive. The result is
a more widely dispersed escapement distribution and lower average biomass yield.
19We must also assume frictionless quota trading and a perfectly competitive quota market.
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Figure 3: Harvest and Investment under the Optimal and CHR Policies
The top panel of Figure 3 shows the harvest rate under the optimal policy (the optimal
harvest rate has been smoothed for presentation purposes) and the CHR rule holding the
fleet size at its median value, k = 58 and for z = 1. The beginning period stock abundance
x is shown on the horizontal axis. At low levels of abundance (x < 210 million pounds)
the optimal harvest rate is below the CHR. The optimal policy rebuilds the stock more
aggressively than does the CHR. At intermediate levels of abundance the optimal harvest
rate is close to the CHR, and at biomass levels exceeding 280 million pounds, the optimal
harvest rate is below the CHR. Recall that harvesting capital is fixed in the current period.
While abundance is high harvesting large quantities of fish with the current fleet of k = 58
boats raises average harvesting costs. It is better to reduce the harvest rate and bank some
of the excess stock, which can be harvested in future by a larger vessel fleet. The CHR does
not allow this level of flexibility to adjust the harvest intertemporally.
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The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows the optimal capital investment and capital investment
under the CHR rule. As above, the current fleet size is k = 58, z = 1, the horizontal axis
shows stock abundance at the beginning of a period. The diﬀerences between the two capital
investment policies are most pronounced at low and high levels of stock abundance. Notice
that for x below 200 million pounds, more vessels are being removed from the fleet under
the optimal policy. This is because the managers is aggressively rebuilding the stock and
harvest is expected to be low one period ahead. Under the CHR, a higher one-period-ahead
harvest is expected and divestment is muted. At high levels of the beginning period stock,
the optimal policy is banking fish for future harvest (relative to the CHR). In anticipation of
the higher future harvest fleet size is increase by a larger amount than under the CHR rule.
A comparison of the value functions finds that managing the fishery with a value maxi-
mizing CHR rule but allowing capital to adjust optimally reduces the value of the fishery by
1−2%. While the CHR rule diﬀers from the optimal policy in its ability to respond to small
and large levels of stock abundance, it appears to provide a reasonably good approximation
to the optimal harvest policy in this fishery.
Column 3 of Table 3 reports the results for the case of an optimal harvest policy but
under a fixed fleet size of 583 vessels. Here we solve for the harvest policy that maximizes
the value of the fishery conditional on k = 583. We assume a cost of $27, 000 is required to
refit vessels to fish for halibut each season. This experiment is intended to isolate the eﬀects
of the quota trading restrictions currently in place for the Alaskan halibut fleet.
The results in column 3 indicate that mean escapement is smaller and less variable than
under the optimal policy. This is explained by the flattening of the harvest net benefit func-
tion under a 583 vessel fleet. Observe that on average the catch per boat is a mere 53.26
thousand pounds, which is only 10.1% of the catch per boat under the optimal policy. At
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these low levels for h/k, variation in the catch per boat implies only small changes in mar-
ginal harvest costs and consequently, the incentive to smooth the harvest is less important.
Turning to the economic welfare measures, we find that mean consumer surplus changes
very little. Industry profits under the large and fixed fishing fleet are roughly 35% of profits
under the optimal policy. This profit reduction is the result of a small catch per boat and
corresponding high average harvesting costs.
Column 4 of Table 3 reports the result under a CHR rule and a fixed fleet size. This
scenario represents the current management program in the Alaskan pacific halibut fishery.
We report results for the fishery value maximizing CHR, conditional on k = 583. The
results indicate that the harvest rate is smaller than the average harvest rate under the
optimal policy (column 1) resulting in higher average escapement. Escapement is more
variable under the CHR rule, than under the optimal policy.
Comparing the results in column 2 and column 4 shows that, faced with a fleet size fixed
at 583 boats, the manager should reduce the CHR from 13.26% to 11.50%, and maintain
a larger stock size. The explanation for this result is that the average costs savings from
maintaining a large in situ stock are more important when spread across the much larger
number of boats.
A comparison of value functions indicates that quota trading restriction, which maintain
the harvest fleet at almost 10 times larger than the optimal fleet size, reduce the value of
the fishery by between 13 − 19%. It should be emphasized that our model is calibrated to
Management Unit 3A and assumes the halibut fleet consisting of class 2 boats. Estimates
of lost fishery value could also be aﬀected by errors in calibration. The results should be
interpreted accordingly.
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5 Conclusion
This paper solves for the optimal management policy in a fishery that is subject to stock
growth uncertainty and costly capital adjustment. Value function iteration is used to obtain
numerical solutions. With costly capital adjustment, marginal net harvest benefits diminish
with the catch. This provides an incentive to smooth harvest over time. Harvest smoothing
implies increased variability of the in situ fish stock. With density dependent stock growth,
high variability of the stock will imply low average harvest yield. We show that maximizing
the value of a fishery involves an optimal level of catch smoothing in order to balance these
trade-oﬀs.
Our results demonstrate the importance of jointly determining harvest and capital in-
vestment. Increased fleet size raises the immediate harvest value of the fish stock. All else
equal, the fishery manager should increase current period catch if the fishing fleet is large,
and leave more fish in the sea if the fleet is small. Leaving more fish for future harvest allows
time to invest in more fishing boats which can harvest the surplus stock at lower cost and
increase fishery value.
Viewed from the capital investment perspective, the harvest policy determines the level
and variability of the stock and harvest over time and consequently determines the value of
vessel capital employed in the fishery. The capital investment incentives associated with a
particular harvesting rule must be carefully considered if the management goal is to maximize
fishery value.
Extensions of the methodology used in this paper could provide additional insights for
fisheries management. For instance, we have focussed on uncertainty in stock growth, as-
suming throughout that true abundance is observed by the manager.20 Other sources of
20Clark and Kirkwood (1986) study a fishery management problem in which stock abundance is unobserved
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uncertainty likely to be important in fisheries management include stock measurement error,
uncertainty regarding the true stock growth function and the influence of random environ-
mental shocks (e.g., additive versus multiplicative shocks), output price uncertainty and,
from the perspective of the fisheries manager, uncertainty regarding the true cost of har-
vesting fish and the capital adjustment costs. Our model and the solution technique can
be easily adopted to analyze the eﬀects of the above or other sources of uncertainty on the
optimal harvest and investment policies.
at the time the harvest decision is made and, as in our model, growth is influenced by multiplicative random
shocks. Sethi, et al., (2005) add a third source of uncertainty, mismeasurement of the actual catch of the
fishing fleet. These papers do not consider fishing capital investment, or concave net harvest benefits.
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